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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from the final judgment of the district
court.

The Utah Court of Appeals does not have original

appellate jurisdiction.

The Utah Supreme Court has appellate

jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Const. Art. VIII, $ 3; Utah Code
Ann. §§ 78-2-2(3)(i) (1953).
Utah Court of Appeals.

This matter is transferable to the

Utah Code Ann. S 78-2-2(4) (1987).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
In simple terms, the primary issue on appeal is whether
plaintiff can state a claim against the defendants for injuries
allegedly caused by his voluntary intoxication.

This is a purely

legal issue.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff alleges that on May 21, 1987 he was a patron of
Studebakerfs, a private club.
became intoxicated.

He alleges he drank to excess and

He alleges Studebakerfs negligently

continued to serve him drinks at his request, though he was
obviously drunk.

He alleges he left Studebaker's and traveled to

another private club, the Sun.

He alleges employees of the Sun

negligently served him more drinks at his request, despite his
obvious drunken state.

He alleges he literally became falling

down drunk and hit his head.

He seeks to recover for injuries

which resulted from his own excessive drinking.
Studebaker's denies each and every allegation of the
Complaint and can barely resist expounding upon the sordid and
colorful facts. However, the matter before the court is the

review of the trial court's grant of a rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss.

This court is therefore "obliged to construe the

complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and to
indulge all reasonable inferences in [his] favor."

E.g.i Arrow

Indus, v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 767 P.2d 935, 936 (Utah 1988).
Thus, despite the Appellant's unnecessarily inflammatory
recitation of "facts," rather than "allegations" contained in the
complaint, Studebaker's will follow the rules and standards of
review as it understands them.
There is one fact which is very relevant because it relates
to the procedure followed in the district court.

Page 2 of Mr.

Horton's brief states: "Memoranda of counsel was timely filed . .
. ."

That statement of fact is incorrect.

Plaintiff's memoranda

was not filed timely.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

Plaintiff waived his opposition to the motion to

dismiss by failing to timely file a memorandum opposing the
motion.

Plaintiff failed to preserve his right to appeal.

Plaintiff's memoranda to the trial court was untimely under
the rules of practice of the district court.
heard for the first time on appeal.

He should not be

Such a procedure can only

encourage sloth and subject this court, the trial court and the
parties to unnecessary expense and delay.

-2-

2.

Plaintiff's recovery is preempted by the Utah Dramshop

Act.
The Utah Dramshop Act, Utah Code Ann, § 23A-14-1 et. sea.,
(1953) ("the Act") gives third parties who are injured by an
intoxicated person a limited recovery.

The Act preempts recovery

for injuries caused by a person's own intoxication.

At least the

following rules of statutory construction dictate this
conclusion:
A.

Courts will not inflate, expand, stretch or extend

statutes to matters not falling within their express provisions.
Allowing Horton to recover in this case would effectively expand
the statute by judicial fiat.
B.

All terms in an Act must be given meaning.

The

legislature used the terms "third person" when describing those
who may recover, rather than simply "person."

The term "third"

is a term of limitation and exclusion and must be given meaning.
C.

The primary consideration in interpreting statutes is

the purpose and intent of the legislature.

Express legislative

purposes of the Act include limiting recovery, prohibiting
recovery against state agencies or employees and requiring
actions to be brought within two years.

If this court adopts a

common law recovery for the excessive drinker, that claim will be
unlimited, may be brought against the state and will ordinarily
be subject to a four year limitations period.
inconsistent with express legislative intent.

-3-

Such a result is

D.

Statutory interpretations which are unjust or absurd

must be avoided.

As described above, a common law cause of

action in favor of the drunkard would give the drunkard greater
rights that an innocent third party would have, an unjust and
absurd result.
E.

The expression of one thing in a statute excludes by

implication things not expressed,
alterius.

expressio unius est exclusio

Third party recovery is expressly allowed by the Act.

The Act is silent on the topic of the recovery by the intoxicated
person.
F.

The legislature is presumed to know existing common law

and intended to change that common law only as clearly indicated.
There was no dramshop type recovery at common law when the Act
was passed.

There was no reason for the legislature to expressly

say "those who drink to excess cannot recover for injuries caused
by their own intoxication.11

The legislature understood this was

already Utah common law and so it merely stated the corollary, it
described those who could recover.
G.

Where the legislature amends a portion of a statute,

leaving a portion intact, the legislature is presumed to have
been satisfied with prior judicial constructions of the unaltered
portions of the statute and to have adopted those constructions
as consistent with its own intent.
in 1981.

The Dramshop Act was passed

Later that same year this court stated there was no

dramshop recovery, except under the statute, and third parties
only could recover.

In 1985 the Act was repealed and reenacted.
-4-

The language limiting recovery to third parties was retained.

In

1986, the statute was again amended, but the language limiting
recovery to third parties was retained.

In 1986, this court

stated once more there was no dramshop recovery except by
statute.

In 1989 the Act was again amended, but the language

limiting recovery to third parties was retained.

There was

simply no need for the legislature to expressly state that
"drunks may not recover under the statute."

This court said it.

The legislature by its actions agreed.
H.

This court has the duty to render such interpretation

of the statutes of Utah as will best promote protection of the
public.

Compensating those who drink to excess and injure

themselves will only encourage behavior which endangers the
health and well being of excessive drinkers and innocent citizens
alike.
3.

By statute, Utah common law is the common law of

England, which would allow no recovery.
Utah common law is the common law of England—except where
repugnant to the state or federal constitutions or laws, or
inconsistent with the natural and physical condition of the state
or the necessities of the Utah people.

Until very recently,

there was no dramshop recovery under English or American common
law, particularly for the person who is injured by his or her own
excessive drinking.

This common law rule is not repugnant to the

state or federal constitutions or laws, or inconsistent with the

-5-

natural and physical condition of the state or the necessities of
the Utah people.
4.

Plaintiff should not be compensated for injuries which

directly result from his own crimes.
It was a crime if Mr. Horton purchased alcoholic beverages
while under the influence of intoxicating beverages or drugs.

It

was also a crime if Mr. Horton became intoxicated to a degree
that he endangered himself or others. Mr. Horton should not now
benefit from his own criminal conduct.
5.

As a matter of law, plaintiff's fault was greater than

that of the defendants.
Plaintiff may not recover if his own fault was equal to or
greater than that of the defendants.

The effects of alcohol vary

with the age, weight, physical condition, health, experience,
genetic makeup and emotional state of the person who is drinking.
They also vary with the quantity of alcohol consumed, the speed
at which it is consumed, and the nature and quantity of food,
water, drugs or other substances consumed before, during and
after the consumption of alcohol.

Plaintiff alone was in a

position to know all of those factors and judge the effects of
the alcohol before he became visibly intoxicated.

As a matter of

law, no reasonable juror could conclude that Mr. Horton's fault
was less than that of the defendants.

-6-

6.

Allowing plaintiff to recover for his own excessive

consumption of alcohol will encourage such excess, to the
detriment of the health of Utah citizens and contrary to strong
public policy.
Intoxication to the point that a person becomes a threat to
his or her safety or the safety of others is unquestionably
against strong public policy.

Allowing a drunkard to recover for

injuries caused by his or her own excess can only encourage such
excess and cause untold pain and suffering of the drunkard and
the innocent alike.
7.

There is no lustification for altering traditional and

longstanding rules regarding duty.
An essential element of a negligence action is a duty owed
to the plaintiff by the defendant.

The law imposes upon one

party an affirmative duty to look after another's safety only
when certain special relationships exist.

These relationships

arise when one assumes responsibility for another's safety or
deprives another of his or her normal opportunities for selfprotection.

Those who provide liquor do not assume

responsibility for their patrons' safety, nor do they deprive
their patrons of their normal opportunities for self-protection.
There is no justification for imposing duties upon the defendants
which are inconsistent with longstanding rules regarding duty.

-7-

8.

If this court allows the plaintiff to recover, it must

arbitrarily limit recovery or open the flood gates to trivial and
speculative claims.
If this court carves out a special duty to drunks, it must
arbitrarily limit recovery or the courts will be flooded with
trivial claims or claims where causation and damages are
speculative.

What if Horton had not passed out, but had suffered

from nausea, vomiting and insomnia?

Will it be compensable?

What if the nausea and vomiting offended a boss or business
associate, will the drunk be entitled to recover for a lost job,
a lost business opportunity?

Should the drunk recover for

property damage, a soiled suit or carpet?
car?

Property damage to his

What about the drinker who suffers the effects of chronic,

long-term exposure to alcohol?

What about the drinker who claims

that excessive drinking on one or two occasions at the local
tavern resulted in his addiction to alcohol?
9.

The legislature is in the best position to regulate the

sale and consumption of alcohol and the liability from the sale
and consumption of alcohol.
The legislative and executive branches control the sale and
consumption of alcohol as dictated by complex rules, regulations
and statutes, to serve competing, and sometimes inconsistent,
goals.

The rules governing the sale and consumption of alcoholic

beverages, and liability for the same, have unique impact upon
tourism, a major Utah industry, the statefs revenue and the moral
views and physical health of Utah citizens.
-8-

The legislature is

best suited to deal with these competing interests through the
political process, with the benefit of input from physical and
mental health professionals, the liquor commission, the tourism
industry, and the public.

This is an area where judicial

activism is particularly inappropriate.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
PLAINTIFF WAIVED HIS OPPOSITION TO THE MOTION
TO DISMISS BY FAILING TO OPPOSE THE MOTION
TIMELY, AS REQUIRED BY LOCAL RULES.
PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PRESERVE HIS RIGHT TO
APPEAL.
Studebaker's motion to dismiss and supporting memorandum was
mailed on October 10, 1988. Under rule 2.8(b) of the Rules of
Practice in the District Courts and Circuit Courts of the State
of Utah as they existed then, Mr. Horton was required to file a
responsive memoranda within ten days. Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure 6 added three days because the motion had been mailed:
The responding party shall file and serve upon all
parties within ten (10) days after service of the
motion, a statement of answering points and authorities
and counter-affidavits.
The filing of a responding brief was not elective.
mandatory "shall" was used was no accident.

That the

Rule 2.8(c), sets a

time limit for filing the reply memoranda of the moving party.
There the term "may" is used to indicate that the moving party is
not required to file a reply brief, but if one is to be filed it
must be filed timely.

-9-

It should be pointed out the on October 30, 1988, the Code
of Judicial Administration became effective.

Rules 4-501(2) and

4-501(3) of that code are identical to rules 2.8(b) and 2.8(c).
The hearing notice was mailed on October 13, 1988 (R.26), so
plenty of forewarning had been given.

At no time did Horton seek

an extension of time in which to respond.

At no time did Horton

provide the court with an excuse which justified the violation of
the rules.
This court has repeatedly held:
For a question to be considered on appeal, the record must
clearly show that it was timely presented to the trial court
in a manner sufficient to obtain a ruling thereon; we cannot
merely assume that it was properly raised. The burden is on
the parties to make certain that the record they compile
will adequately preserve their arguments for review in the
event of an appeal.
Busch Corp. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 743 P.2d 1217, 1219
(Utah 1987) (quoting Franklin Financial v. New Empire Dev. Co.,
659 P.2d 1040, 1045 (Utah 1983)).
The reason for the rule is axiomatic, longstanding, hornbook
law.

The trial court must be given an effective opportunity to

correct an error.

A party who has not properly raised an issue

where it can be addressed most quickly and economically should
not be entitled to complain and thereby consume the time and
resources of this court and other parties.

Any other rule would

give an obstreperous party endless potential for repeated appeals
and delay.

Any other rule would defeat completely the goal of

efficient administration of justice.

This court cannot assume

the issue was raised at the trial level.
-10-

This rule is a mere technicality unless this court gives
substance and meaning to the qualifiers "timely" and
"sufficient."
Until the promulgation of the Code of Judicial
Administration, local rules were essential to assure the orderly,
impartial and efficient administration of justice.

Local rules

must be enforced to be effective.
It was a reasonable exercise of the inherent powers of the
district court to require that those opposing a motion brief the
issues before the court or accept the granting of the motion.
The plaintiff failed to timely and sufficiently preserve his
right to appeal.
POINT II
THE UTAH DRAMSHOP ACT PREEMPTS AND PRECLUDES
COMMON LAW RECOVERY BY A DRUNK FOR INJURIES
CAUSED BY THE DRUNK1S OWN INTOXICATION.
The Utah Dramshop Act, Utah Code Ann. § 32A-14-1 (1953)
states:
(1) Any person who directly gives, sells, or otherwise
provides liquor, or at a location allowing consumption
on the premises, any alcoholic beverage to a person:
(a) who is under the age of 21 years or
(b) who is apparently under the influence of
intoxicating alcoholic beverages or products or
drugs or
(c) whom the person furnishing the alcoholic
beverage knew or should have known from the
circumstances was under the influence of
intoxicating alcoholic beverages or products or
drugs or

-11-

(d) who is a known interdicted person and by
those actions causes the intoxication of that
person, Is liable for injury in person, property,
or means of support of any third person, or to the
spouse, child, or parent of that third person
resulting from the intoxication . . . .
(emphasis added).
As this court observed:
The Dramshop Act allows third parties to recover from
those improperly providing liquor, but does not allow
the intoxicated person to recover from the provider.
Therefore, one injured as a result of his or her own
voluntary but unlawful intoxication would appear to be
without remedy against the provider of the alcohol,
either under the Dramshop Act or under common law.
Beach v. University of Utah, 726 P.2d 413, 417, n.3 (Utah 1986).
The tenth circuit has gone further and held that the Utah
Dramshop Act preempts and precludes any common law recovery of a
person for injuries caused by his or her own voluntary
intoxication.

Tovar v. Lee, Civil No. 84-1540 (10th Cir. 1984)

(attached as Appen. A ) . The tenth circuit decision is supported
by at least the following important rules of statutory
construction:
A.

Courts will not inflate, expand, stretch or extend statutes

to matters not falling within their express provisions.
It is axiomatic that the role of the judiciary in
interpreting and applying statutes passed by the legislature is
to discern the intent of the co-equal legislative branch of
government.

"This Courtfs primary responsibility in construing

legislation is to give effect to the intent of the legislature."
American Coal Co. v. Sandstrom, 689 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah 1984).

-12-

It is

not the role of this court to critique or rewrite legislation or
second guess decisions of public policy reached through the
political process.

It is for this reason that courts will not

inflate, expand, stretch or extend statutes to matters not
falling within their express provisions.

E.g.. City of Phoenix

v. Denofrio, 99 Ariz. 130, 407 P.2d 91, 93 (1965) (en banc).
Horton asks this court to do exactly that.

He would like

this court to substitute its judgment for that of the legislature
and supplement the Dramshop Act with a remedy for the drunkard
when the legislature did not see fit to do so.
B.

All terms used in a statute must be given meaning.
Utah courts have often held that all of the terms used in a

statute must be given meaning.

In construing legislative

enactments, the reviewing court assumes each term in the statute
was used advisedly.

"This Court therefore interprets and applies

the statute according to its literal wording unless it is
unreasonably confused or inoperable."

E.g., Home v. Home, 737

P.2d 244, 247 (Utah App. 1987).
The terms "third persons" are not unreasonably confused or
inoperable.

They were used to describe those who could recover

for injuries caused by the drunkard that was improperly served
alcohol.

Had the legislature intended that the drunkard recover

for his or her own injuries, it would not have gone to the
trouble of including the term "third."

That term is a term of

limitation and exclusion and should be given meaning.

-13-

C.

The statute must be interpreted in light of its purposes.
This court has repeatedly held that a statute must be

interpreted in light of its legislative purposes.

"Where

statutory language is plain and unambiguous, this Court will not
look beyond the same to divine legislative intent,"
V. Forsvth, 779 P.2d 685, 686 (Utah 1979).

Brinkerhoff

According to the

plain language of the statute, the express purposes of the
legislature in enacting the Dramshop Act include limiting
recovery.

In addition, the legislature wished to exclude any

liability of the state or its agencies or employees.

Finally,

the legislature intended any dramshop action be commenced before
two years.
If this court adopts a common law recovery, these purposes
will be destroyed.

The excessive drinker will be given unlimited

recovery against private and governmental persons and entities
alike.

The claim for non-fatal injuries will be subject to a

four year limitations period.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-13-25(3)

(1953) .
D.

Statutory interpretations that produce unjust or absurd

results must be avoided.
A sound rule of statutory interpretation is that a
statute is presumed not to be intended to produce
absurd consequences and that where possible it will be
given a reasonable and sensible construction.
Curtis v. Harmon Elec, Inc., 575 P.2d 1044, 1046 (Utah 1978).
If the Dramshop Act does not preempt and preclude a common law
recovery for the drunkard for injuries caused by his own

-14-

excesses, and if this court accepts Horton's invitation to adopt
one, then the drunkard will have much greater rights than an
innocent third party as described above. This result is nothing
short of unjust and absurd.
E.

Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. The expression of

one thing in a statute is taken to exclude by implication things
not expressed.
This is not a hard and fast rule to be blindly applied.

Rio

Grande Motorway, Inc. v. Public Service Commission, 21 Utah 377,
445 P.2d 990, 992 (1968).
intuition.

It is a matter of common logic and

This fundamental principal of human understanding

does not need a fancy name, latin or otherwise.
door says simply "men."

It does not say:

"men.

The men's room
Not women.'1

No

one would question the fact that the second sentence is by
implication intended by the first.

No one needs a rule of

construction to understand that the expression of one thing
ordinarily excludes another.
F.

It is presumed that the legislature was familiar with common

law as it existed when a statute was enacted.
It is presumed that the legislature is familiar with the
state of the common law at the time of enacting a statute.

That

common law becomes part of the statute, except as it is expressly
changed by the statute.

See, E.g., Home v. Home, 737 P.2d 244,

248 (Utah App. 1987) .
Before the late seventies and early eighties, only a small
number of states had recognized common law dramshop recovery of
-15-

any kind.

In the late seventies and early eighties, a small

number of state courts started to change longstanding common law
rules and

allow third parties to recover.

See, the appendix in

Lino v. Jan's Liquors, 237 Kan. 629, 703 P.2d 731, 739 (Kan.
1985) which lists the status of the law in all fifty states as of
1985.
It was against this background that the Utah Dramshop Act
was passed in 1981.
allowed no recovery.

The legislature understood that common law
It changed the no recovery rule for a

limited recovery rule with respect to third parties only.

It

intended to incorporate the common law rule of no recovery with
respect to the intoxicated person.

The legislature having done

so, this court is not free to adopt a common law recover for Mr.
Horton by judicial fiat.
G.

Where the legislature amends a portion of a statute, leaving

other portions unamended, the legislature is presumed to have
been satisfied with prior judicial constructions of the unaltered
portions of the statute and to have adopted those constructions
as consistent with its own intent.
This court has repeatedly held:
Where the legislature amends a portion of a statute,
leaving other portions unamended, or re-enacts a
portion without change, absent substantial evidence to
the contrary, the legislature is presumed to have been
satisfied with prior judicial constructions of the
unaltered portions of the statute and to have adopted
those constructions as consistent with its own intent.
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American Coal Co, v. Sandstrom, 689 P. 1, 3 (Utah 1984).

See

also, Christensen v. Indust. Comm'n, 642 P.2d 755, 756 (Utah
1982)•
The Utah Dramshop Act was initially enacted in 1981,
effective May, 1981.

1981 Utah Laws, ch. 152. Before the

statute there had been no common law dramshop recovery in Utah by
the drunkard or anyone else.

Later that same year, this court

stated:
Prior to trial, defendants filed motions for
summary judgment seeking, inter alia, a determination
that there can be no cause of action against one who
furnishes liquor in favor of those injured by the
intoxication of the person so furnished. The trial
court properly refused to adopt by judicial fiat
remedies commonly available under so-called "civil
damage" or "dramshop" acts.
Yost v. State, 640 P.2d 1044, 1046 (Utah 1981) (footnotes
omitted).

This court has called this dicta.

This court noted:
The reason usually given for this general rule at
common law is that the drinking of the liquor, and not
the furnishing of it, is the proximate cause of the
injury.
Id. at 1046, n.2 (citation omitted).
In 1985, the act was repealed and reenacted.

Beach v.

University of Utah, 726 P.2d 413, 417, n. 3 (Utah 1986); 1985
Utah Laws, ch.175.

The language limiting recovery to third

parties was retained without change.
In 1986, this court decided Beach v. University of Utah, 726
P. 413 (Utah 1986).

There this court stated:
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The Dramshop Act allows third parties to recover from
those improperly providing liquor, but does not allow
the intoxicated person to recover from the provider.
Therefore, one injured as a result of his or her own
voluntary but unlawful intoxication would appear to be
without remedy against the provider of the alcohol,
either under the Dramshop Act or under common law.
Id. at 417, n. 3 (citation omitted).

This is apparently dicta.

In 1989 the Act was amended again, but the language limiting
recovery to third parties was retained unchanged.

1989 Utah

Laws, ch. 240.
It is much too late for this court to believe the slate is
clean.

This court has interpreted the statute and common law and

the legislature has agreed.

The drunkard cannot recover for

injuries cause by his own intoxication.
G.

This court has a duty to render such interpretation of the

statutes of the state as will best promote protection of the
public.
"This Court recognizes its duty to render such
interpretation of the laws as will best promote the protection of
the public."

Curtis v. Harmon Elec, Inc., 575 P.2d 1044, 1046

(Utah 1978).
A rule of liability here could have no other possible
effect upon patrons than to encourage them to excessive
liquor consumption at taverns. Forthwith upon the
announcement of a rule of law which permits a drunken
patron to recover damages for his own injuries from the
tavern keeper, patrons who have heretofore felt concern
for their own safety should they become overly
intoxicated will relax their personal efforts, for
three readily apparent reasons. First, because they
will assume that the bartenders will exercise greater
care on their behalf; second, because they very
naturally will feel that if they are hurt they will be
compensated for such hurt; and third, because we will
-18-

in effect have encouraged their over indulgence, by
pampering their delinquency. It cannot be otherwise.
The already tragic statistics which so horribly
describe the slaughter of innocent persons by drunk
drivers will immediately increase, to society's further
disadvantage.
Tovar v. Lee, Civil No. 84-1540 at 4-5 (10th Cir. 1984) (quoting
Rindt v. Kauffman, 57 Cal. App. 3d 845, 129 Cal. Rptr. 603, 61112 (1976)).
This court has said:
The fact of common knowledge that the drinking driver
is the cause of so many of the more serious automobile
accidents is strong evidence in itself to support the
need for all possible means of deterring persons from
driving automobiles after drinking, including exposure
to awards of punitive damages in the event of
accidents.
Johnson v. Rogers, 763 P.2d 771, 775 (Utah 1988) (quoting Taylor
v. Superior Court of Los Angeles Co., 24 Cal.3d 890, 897, 598
P.2d 854, 857, 157 Cal.Rptr. 693, 697 (1979).
The same rationale supports a rule that makes the excessive
drinker responsible for his own actions and his own injuries.

If

there is any possibility that there will be a deterrent effect,
this court should adopt the rule that will best deter drunk
drivers.

That rule is one that makes the drunk liable for

injuries caused to others and injuries caused to himself.

The

drinker is in the very best position to prevent injury to himself
and others.
If the dramshop proprietor was held liable for injuries of
the drunk in addition to injuries to third parties, precious
little additional deterrent would be provided.
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This court would certainly not be alone if it held that a
state dramshop act which allowed recovery to third persons
precluded recovery by the intoxicated person.

E.g.. Connallv v.

Conlan, 371 N.W.2d 832, 833 (Iowa 1985); Meanv v. Newell, 367
N.W.2d 472, 474-75 (Minn. 1985).

Nor would this court be alone

if it ruled that a state dramshop act did not preclude common law
recover.
(1980).

E.g., Kowal v. Hofher, 181 Conn. 355, 436 A.2d 1, 2
It is not, however, a question of which group of sheep

to follow.

Each state presumably has a relatively unique

statute, with unique legislative history and perhaps even unique
rules of statutory construction which must be followed.

The

issue is whether the Utah Dramshop Act was intended to preclude
common law recovery.

It was.
POINT III

BY STATUTE, UTAH COMMON LAW IS THE COMMON LAW
OF ENGLAND, WHICH WOULD PRECLUDE PLAINTIFF'S
RECOVERY.
The Common Law of England, so far as it is not
repugnant to, or in conflict with, the Constitution or
laws of the United States, or the Constitution or laws
of this state, and so far only as it is consistent with
and adapted to the natural and physical conditions of
this state and the necessities of the people hereof, is
hereby adopted, and shall be the rule of decision in
all courts of this state.
Utah Code Ann., § 68-3-1 (1953).
There is no question that the exceptions and qualifications
to the rule are many and broad.

Nor is there any dispute that

portions of Utah common law should evolve predictably and orderly
in light of changes in societies norms and the needs of Utah's
-20-

people.

This does not mean, however, that the statute can be

ignored altogether, as if it did not exist.

Such a notion would

be inconsistent with the fundamental fabric of the state
constitution's balance of power.
The very basic and time honored principles of law in this
case have not changed, nor should they.

Mr. Horton seeks to

recover for injuries he claims were caused in part by the
negligence of others, hardly a novel or new concept given birth
by changing times, changing societal norms or the unique
situation in Utah.

It would be silly to assume that problems

associated with the consumption of alcohol are novel or new.
If anything, the increased potential for physical injury
afforded by the widespread use of the automobile and power
machinery, the increased awareness of Utah's citizens to the
physical, economic, and emotional costs of excessive consumption
of alcohol, and the moral convictions of a large portion of the
state's population should compel this court to demand more
responsibility of those who drink, not less.
There simply is no justification for modifying the common
law rule precluding dramshop recovery of a drunk for the injuries
his own behavior causes him.
POINT IV
PLAINTIFF SHOULD NOT BENEFIT FROM HIS OWN
CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR.
The brief of plaintiff suggests he should be excused for his
behavior, that of excessive consumption of alcohol, for the very
-21-

reason that he drank to excess.

Horton claims that under the law

he has no responsibility to monitor or limit his consumption of
alcohol.

The poor dear should be excused, coddled, pitied and

most of all held immune and harmless.
Such a position is patently inconsistent with Utah law.

It

was a class C misdemeanor if, as he alleges, Horton was under the
influence of intoxicating liquor to a degree that he endangered
himself or others in a public place.
701(1) (1953).

Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-

It was a class B misdemeanor for Horton to

purchase alcohol while under the influence of alcohol.

Utah Code

Ann. § 32A-12-210 (1953) (formerly Utah Code Ann. § 32A-12-13.3;
1985 Utah Laws, ch. 82, § 2).
Contrary to plaintiff's position, he is not excused by
reason of intoxication:
Voluntary intoxication shall not be a defense to a
criminal charge unless such intoxication negates the
existence of the mental state which is an element of an
offense; however, if recklessness or criminal
negligence establishes an element of an offense and the
actor is unaware of the risk because of the voluntary
intoxication, his unawareness is immaterial in the
prosecution for that offense.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-306 (1953).

Recklessness is a sufficient

mental state to establish plaintiff's criminal behavior.

Utah

Code Ann. § 76-2-104 (1953).
This court has found that the drunk may be guilty of
recklessness in a civil context.

Johnson v. Rogers, 763 P.2d

771, 775-76 (Utah 1988) .
It violates strong public policy to compensate someone for
the results of his or her own serious criminal behavior.
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POINT V
AS A MATTER OF LAW, THE PLAINTIFF WAS MORE
NEGLIGENT THAN THE DEFENDANTS.
If plaintiff was as negligent, or more negligent, than the
defendants, his recovery is barred.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-37

(1953).
Ordinarily, negligence is a question for the trier of fact.
However, when reasonable minds cannot differ, the court must rule
as a matter of law.

Reasonable minds cannot differ as to whether

the person who gets so intoxicated that he passes out and hurts
himself is at least as negligent as the person who sold him the
liquor.
The effects of alcohol on a particular individual vary as a
function of the following factors:
(1)

age and weight;

(2)

genetic and chemical makeup;

(3)

amount of alcohol consumed;

(4)

speed at which the alcohol is consumed;

(5)

ingestion of other substances such as prescription and

non-prescription drugs;
(6)

experience;

(7)

the amount of food and nonalcoholic fluids consumed

with or before the alcohol;
(8)

physical condition; and

(9)

emotional state.
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The plaintiff knew best his tolerance for alcohol based upon age,
weight, experience, condition and emotional state.

The

plaintiff, alone, knew what he ingested before entering
Studebaker's. The plaintiff alone could gage the effects of
alcohol by how he felt, before the alcohol effected his actions.
It was plaintiff, alone, who ordered alcohol and decided whether,
how much and how fast to consume it.

Plaintiff was responsible

to monitor the alcohol consumption of only one person.

The

defendants were required to monitor the consumption of many.

It

was plaintiff alone who left Studebaker's to go to another tavern
to consume more alcohol.

At that point Studebaker's had no

ability to prevent him from consuming alcohol.

When he arrived

at the Sun, they had no knowledge of his prior ingestion of
alcohol, food, or other substances.
The plaintiff's voluntary intoxication does not excuse his
negligence or modify his duty to act reasonably to protect
himself from harm.

E.g., Tome v. Berea Pewter Mug, Inc., 4 Ohio

App. 3d 98, 102, 446 N.E.2d 848, 853 (Ohio App. 1982).

The

plaintiff had the same duty of care as a sober person under the
same circumstances.
As a matter of law, reasonable people could not find that
Horton's own negligence was less than that of the defendants.
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POINT VI
ALLOWING PLAINTIFF TO RECOVER FOR HIS OWN
EXCESSIVE CONSUMPTION OF ALCOHOL WILL
ENCOURAGE SUCH EXCESS, TO THE DETRIMENT OF
THE HEALTH OF UTAH CITIZENS AND CONTRARY TO
STRONG PUBLIC POLICY.
This is not just a rehash of the same argument as that
raised with regard to the interpretation of the Dramshop Act.

If

this court decides that the Act does not preclude commonlaw
recovery, it must then decide if Utah recognizes such common law
recovery for the drunkard.
problem.

Drunk driving is a very serious

This court has recognized there is a "trend to maximize

punishment and deterrence of impaired drivers."
Rogers, 763 P.2d 771, 775 (Utah 1988).

Johnson v.

It would be inappropriate

indeed to give drunk drivers the mixed signal that they will be
criminally punished, held responsible in civil cases for injuries
they cause by drinking and driving and even punished in civil
cases, but, if they manage to injure themselves, the state will
give them a forum and incur great cost to see that their loss is
passed along to someone else.
POINT VII
THERE IS NO JUSTIFICATION FOR ALTERING
LONGSTANDING RULES REGARDING DUTY. THE
DEFENDANTS DID NOT OWE PLAINTIFF A DUTY TO
PROTECT HIM FROM HARMING HIMSELF.
An essential element of a negligence claim is a duty owed to
the plaintiff by the defendant.

E.g., Owens v. Garfield, 784

P.2d 1187, 1189 (Utah 1989); Beach v. University of Utah, 726
P.2d 413, 415 (Utah 1986).
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Ordinarily, a party does not have an affirmative duty
to care for another. Absent unusual circumstances
which justify imposing such an affirmative
responsibility, "one has no duty to look after the
safety of another who has become voluntarily
intoxicated and thus limited his ability to protect
himself." Benallv v. Robinson, 14 Utah 2d 6, 9, 376
P.2d 388, 390 (1962). The law imposes upon one party
an affirmative duty to act only when certain special
relationships exist between the parties. These
relationships generally arise when one assumes
responsibility for another's safety or deprives another
of his or her normal opportunities for self-protection.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314A (1962). The
essence of a special relationship is dependence by one
party upon the other or mutual dependence between the
parties.
Beach v. University of Utah, 726 P.2d 413, 415-16 (Utah 1986)
(footnote omitted).
Plaintiff seems to argue that criminal statutes regulating
the sale of alcohol were intended to protect a drunk from the
effects of consuming too much alcohol.

The plaintiff cites to no

legislative history for this proposition.
careful analysis

More importantly, a

of the statutes would seem to indicate that

they were intended to protect third parties, not drunks.

For

example, it is not illegal to sell an apparently sober person
copious amounts of alcohol to be consumed at home.

Plaintiff can

purchase numerous twelve packs of beer at one time at nearly any
store.

He can purchase large quantities of hard liquor at a

state store.

There is no statute that requires the seller to

inquire concerning who will consume it or when.

The seller does

not have an obligation to follow the purchaser home to watch and
see it is not consumed too quickly.

The dramshop operator must

only monitor plaintiff's drinking in a public place.
-26-

Nor is it

illegal for plaintiff to drink until he is falling down, passedout drunk if he chooses to do so at home.
is drinking in a public place.

The only prohibition

It would appear that the

legislature was concerned only about excessive drinking in
public.

The only logical explanation is that when someone drinks

to excess in public they must at some time go home, a process
that can maim and kill innocent third parties if the drunk
decides to drive.
Studebaker's simply owed plaintiff no special duty to
protect him from his own excesses.
POINT IIX
IF THIS COURT ADOPTS A COMMON LAW RECOVERY IN
FAVOR OF THOSE WHO DRINK TO EXCESS AND INJURE
THEMSELVES, IT MUST ARBITRARILY LIMIT
RECOVERY OR OPEN THE FLOOD GATES TO TRIVIAL
AND SPECULATIVE CLAIMS.
It is one thing to protect a drunk from serious personal
injury.

Not all personal injuries are serious.

If the plaintiff

becomes nauseated and vomits, technically that is personal
injury.

Will the drunk recover under the proposed new Utah

common law?

What about the drunk who's excesses cause him to

sleep late and loose a job, will the dramshop operator be
responsible?

What about the drunk that only bangs his car up

getting it home, will the dramshop operator be responsible for
property damage?

What about recovery for a soiled suit or

carpet?
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What about chronic exposure to alcohol?

Will the plaintiff

have a claim against every dramshop that served him alcohol
throughout his lifetime?
The potential for fraudulent claims and the difficulties
with proving proximate cause are enormous.

A patron injures

himself in a one car accident, but delays seeking medical
attention for several days.
taken.

No blood alcohol level is ever

Was the accident a product of simple negligence that

would have occurred in any event, or was it proximately caused by
the consumption of alcohol?
four years?

What if the claim is not brought for

The dramshop operator is not likely to remember, and

the only witness is likely to be the drunk.
This highlights a glaring paradox in plaintiffs theories.
The drunk is too drunk to act reasonably or make reasonable
judgments about his ability to drive, etc.

He is however

competent and likely the only witness who can give his judgment
as to whether he was apparently drunk such that the dramshop
operator should not have served him more alcohol.

He is

competent to give his judgment as to whether the accident would
have happened, but for the alcohol.

He is competent to judge the

actions of others, but not competent to judge or control his own.
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POINT IX
THE LEGISLATURE IS IN THE BEST POSITION TO
REGULATE THE SALE AND CONSUMPTION OF ALCOHOL
AND THE LIABILITY FROM THE SALE AND
CONSUMPTION OF ALCOHOL.
Plaintiff maintains that half of the states have accepted
recovery for drunks, the other half have rejected it.
appear to be roughly correct.

That does

See, Annotation, Liability of

Persons Furnishing Intoxicating Liguor for Injury To or Death of
Consumer, Outside Coverage of Civil Damage Acts, 89 A.L.R.3d 1230
(1980) and the cases cited therein.

There does not appear to be

a clear consensus that common law recover for drunks is
desirable.

Such a fact would seem to caution against a rule

imposes by the judiciary.

Close questions are better handled

through the democratic process.
This state earns much of its revenue from the sale of
alcohol and maintains a monopoly on its sale.

The legislative

and executive branches control the sale and consumption of
alcohol as dictated by complex rules, regulations and statutes.
The rules regarding the sale of alcohol effect tourism, a
major industry in Utah.
The sale and consumption of alcohol has particularly acute
moral overtones in this state.
This state has a small population that is spread throughout
a wide geographic area, most of which is not served by any means
of public transportation.

This makes the problem of the drunken

driver particularly acute.
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As in other states the sale and consumption of alcohol
effects the physical and mental health of Utah's citizens.
Plaintiff's brief makes grandiose, unsupported statements
about the drunk's ability for self control.

This court is not

well suited to judge that.
This court is particularly poorly suited to weighing all of
these many competing interests.

It should be left to democratic

government where the public has a voice and the legislature has
access to a broad spectrum of comment from economists, physical
and mental health care professionals, the tourism industry and
the general public.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court's dismissal of
plaintiff's complaint should be affirmed.
DATED this 16th day of October, 1990.
SNOW, CHRISiPBNSEX & MARTJEtfEJ

£hawrf E. Draney
Attorneys for Defen^nt/Appellee
Studebaker's
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After examining the briefs and
three-judge

panel

has

the

appellate

record,

determined unanimously that oral argument

would not be of material assistance in the determination
appeal.

£££. Fed.

R.

this

App.

of

P. 34(a); Tenth Cir. R. 10(e).

this
The

cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
The issue is whether, under Utah law, an
has

a

cause

of

action

against

injuries

sustained

in

person's

voluntary

consumption

dram shop.

a

intoxicated

person

a dram shop owner for personal

motorcycle

accident

caused

by

of intoxicating beverages in the

The district court held that under Utah law there

no such cause of action.

such

We agree.

was

From

the

complaint

we

learn

that Richard Jesse Tovar, an

adultf became intoxicated in a tavern owned by

Merlin

In

or

this

regard,

it

is

alleged

that

Lee,

employees, negligently permitted Tovar to become
that

thereafter,

while

and

is

now,

citizenship.

Federal

in

fact,

a

serious

quadriplegic,

jurisdiction

is

based

a

claim

upon

which

Utah

the

on

personal

Tovar sought
amount

of

diversity

of

Dram

complaint

relief could be granted.

moved for judgment on the pleadings.
the

and

28 U.S.C. § 1332.

In his answer, Lee first pled that the
state

his agents and
intoxicated

general damages from Lee, the dram shop owner, in
$10,000,000*

Lee*

still in an intoxicated condition, Tovar

drove his motorcycle off the road and sustained
injuries

Evan

failed

to

Later, Lee

Lee's position is that under

Shop Act only a third party who sustains injuries

because of the acts of an intoxicated person has a cause of action
against

the

dram

shop

owner who permitted his patron to become

intoxiated, and that the Act does not create

a

cause

of

action

against the dram shop owner on behalf of an intoxicated patron who
himself sustains injury as a result of
Ann.

§

32-11-1,

et

intoxication.

seq. (Supp. 1983).

Utah

Code

At this juncture, Tovar

sought to amend his complaint so as to include

a

separate

claim

against Lee based on a Utah statute relating to the maintenance of
a common or public nuisance.
The district court denied Tovar1s motion to file
complaint

an

amended

and granted Leefs motion for judgment on the pleadings.

A judgment of dismissal followed.

Tovar appeals.

We affirm.

The Utah Dram Shop Act creates, in so many words, a cause

of

action in favor of a third party, who sustains injury at the hands
of

an

intoxicated

permitted

of

against

the

dram

his patron to become intoxicated.

11-1 (Supp. 1983).
cause

person,

action

shop

owner

who

Utah Code Ann. § 32-

However, that statute does ns£ create any such
in

favor of the intoxicated person against the

dram shop owner.
Lee's position is that the Dram Shop Act
that

the

only

is

preemptive

and

cause of action created by that statute is one in

favor of an injured third party against the dram shop owner.
Tovar's position is that .the statute is
that

Tovar,

under

Utah

law,

has

not

preemptive

and

a common law cause of action

against Lee, the dram shop owner, or, in the alternative, that
has

a

he

cause of action under Utah statutory law pertaining to the

maintenance of a public

nuisance.

As

indicated,

the

district

court sustained Lee's position and entered judgment in his favor.
This

is

another

diversity

case

which

judge's understanding of local state law.
the

Utah

Supreme

here involved.

Court

In such

It

turns on a federal
would

appear

that

has not yet addressed the precise issue
circumstance,

the

view

of

a

resident

federal district judge on an unsettled question of local state law
is entitled to some deference by a federal appellate

court,

and,

on review, should not be overturned unless the appellate court has
a rather firm view that the federal
Colonial

Park

Country

district

Club v. Joan of Arc,

Cir. 1984) (No. 83-1333); Budde

v.

judge

erred.

F.2d

Ling-Temco-Vought,

See
(10th

511

F.2d

1033

(10th

Cir.

1975).

We have no such feeling in the instant

case.
Our attention has not been directed to any

Utah

case

which

would support Tovar's contention that he has a common law cause of
action against Lee.
action

in

favor

The Utah Dram Shop Act

creates

a

cause

of

of an injured third party against the dram shop

owner, but creates no corresponding cause of action in favor of an
intoxicated

person

who

injures

himself.

We are disinclined to

disturb the district court's belief that the Utah Dram Shop Act is
preemptive.

In

this

regard, in Miller v. City of Portland, 288

Or. 271, 604 P.2d 1261, 1265 (Or. 1980), the Oregon Supreme
(Or.

1980),

considering

a

dram

shop

act

Court

similar to the Utah

statute, spoke as follows:
This court has never previously recognized a common law
cause of action in favor of a person who suffers injury
resulting from his or her own consumption of alcohol.
Nor have most other courts.
Because it would be
contrary to apparent legislative policy,
we
also
consider it inappropriate to create a common law cause
of action for physical injury to minors caused by their
illegal purchase of alcoholic liquor.
For

a

general

discussion

of

militating against creating a cause of
owner

the

policy

action

considerations

against

a

tavern

in favor of one who voluntarily gets intoxicated, see Kindt

v. Kauffman, 57 Cal. App. 3d 845, 129 Cal. Rptr. 603

(1976).

that case, the court stated:
A rule of liability here could have no other possible
effect upon patrons than to encourage them to excessive
liquor consumption at taverns.
Forthwith upon the
announcement of a rule of law which permits a drunken
patron to recover damages for his own injuries from the
tavern keeper, patrons who have heretofore felt concern
for
their
own
safety should they become overly
intoxicated will relax their personal efforts, for three
readily apparent reasons.
First, because they will

In

assume that the bartenders will exercise greater care on
their behalf; secondf because they very naturally will
feel that if they are hurt they will be compensated for
such hurt; and third, because we . • . will in effect
have encouraged their over indulgence, by pampering
their delinquency. It cannot be otherwise. The already
tragic statistics which so horribly
describe
the
slaughter of innocent persons by drunk drivers will
immediately increase, to society's further disadvantage•
Id* at 611-12.
As stated above, the district court refused to allow Tovar to
amend his complaint so as to include a separate claim based on the
local statute pertaining to a public nuisancer
assigned

as

error.

Although

leave

granted when justice so requires,
granted

leave

to

and

amend
to

amend

such

is

now

shall be freely
need

where .the "futility of amendment" is apparent.

not

be

Mountain

View v. Abbott Laboratories, 630 F.2d 1383, 1389 (10th Cir. 1980).
Believing,

as

we

do, that the Utah Dram Shop Act is preemptive,

there can be no cause of action in favor of

Tovar

based

public nuisance theory.
Judgment affirmed.

HOWARD K. PHILLIPS, Clerk/
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any
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